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Pitfalls in the Use of Foreign Direct Investment Statistics

Abstract:
Foreign direct investment (FDI) statistics are widely used to study the impact of international
capital movements and multinational enterprise (MNE) activities. FDI-intensity is also an
important indicator of globalisation and economic integration. Datasets spanning long time
periods and with broad country coverage have been employed in numerous studies to analyse
various aspects of the determinants and consequences of FDI. Focusing on a relatively
homogeneous group of six Western European EU countries, the present study finds major
inconsistencies in the construction and coverage of these data both through time and across
countries, leading to large discrepancies. Asymmetries will be far greater for broader groups
of more economically and institutionally diverse countries. This study recommends extreme
caution in drawing conclusions based on FDI data.
JEL Code: F21

Keywords: FDI; FDI Statistics; Special Purpose Entity; Balance of Payments

“These data are not clean… One thing that would help is more information about the data
and how they are collected. What procedures do …countries follow to collect these data?
What are the pitfalls?”
Charles Engel (2003, p.115). Comment on International Financial Integration,
IMF Staff Papers.
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1.

INTRODUCTION
Because of their ease of accessibility and extent of coverage, foreign direct

investment (FDI) data – which derive largely from the balance of payments – are widely
used both for international comparative purposes and to track the performance of individual
economies over time. Although these data measure financial flows and stocks of FDI, they
are also used to proxy for multinational enterprise (MNE) activity data, which are less
widely available and lack standardisation.1 FDI data are also included in international
metrics such as globalisation indexes and macroeconomic performance measures.2
In the empirical literature the FDI data have been used to study the impact of inward
investment on growth (see Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan & Sayek., 2004; Borensztein, De Gregorio
& Lee, 1998; Durham, 2004; Li & Liu, 2005; van Hulten & Webber, 2010) and on other
outcomes of interest (see Demir, 2016; Pica & Rodríguez-Mora, 2011). The determinants of
FDI flows have also been extensively studied (see Cleeve, Debrah & Yiheyis, 2015; De
Ménil, 1999; Globerman & Shapiro, 2002; Head & Ries, 2008; Petroulas, 2007; Razin &
Sadka, 2007; Schiavo, 2007; Stein & Daude, 2007; Wei, 2000; Wood, Yin, Mazouz &
Cheah, 2014).
The main international sources of FDI data are the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United

Though Clegg (1992) describes FDI and MNE activity data as ‘two sides of the same coin’, the relationship
between the two is in fact very tenuous (Lipsey, 2003). Barry and O’Mahony (2005) and Griffith (1999) find
MNE investments to be larger and less volatile than the FDI data for US investment in Irish manufacturing, and
the UK transport equipment industry, respectively. Investments funded from host country sources are not
counted as FDI. Dunning and Lundan (2008) are incorrect in suggesting however that FDI can be regarded as a
lower bound on MNE investment, since much current FDI passes through conduit entities without impacting on
local investment. Blanchard and Acalin (2016) look at this latter issue in relation to emerging markets.
Geographic allocations have also become increasingly problematic as conduit entities proliferate, partly driven
by the increasing importance of intangible assets (Lipsey, 2010).
2
For example, in addition to the inclusion of the Net International Investment Position in the European Union’s
Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP), the European Commission uses various measures of FDI flows
and stocks as auxiliary indicators of economic performance (O'Farrell, 2015).
1
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Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the European Statistical
Agency (Eurostat). OECD data are popular in studies that focus on industrialised countries or
where geographically disaggregated data are required (see Borensztein et al., 1998; De Ménil,
1999; De Sousa & Lochard, 2011; Durham, 2004; Hatzius, 2000; Head & Ries, 2008; Pica &
Rodríguez-Mora, 2011; Razin & Sadka, 2007; Stein & Daude, 2007; Wei, 2000). Eurostat
data are often used when the focus is on the EU or on the effects of monetary union (see
Petroulas, 2007), while IMF or UNCTAD data allow for the inclusion of developing
countries. Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Sayek (2004), Durham (2004) and van Hulten and
Webber (2010) use IMF data; Cleeve, Debrah and Yiheyis (2015), Globerman and Shapiro
(2002), Gui-Diby and Renard (2015), Li and Liu (2005), and Wood, Yin, Mazouz and Cheah
(2014) employ UNCTAD data. Some studies, such as Demir (2016), Durham (2004), and
Taylor (2008), combine data from two or more sources.
Large datasets are often preferred covering a large a number of countries for as long a
time period as possible. Alfaro et al. (2004) have 72 countries in their dataset, Borensztein,
De Gregorio and Lee (1998) 69; Demir (2016) 134; Durham (2004) 80; Gui-Diby & Renard
(2015) 47; and Li & Liu (2005) 84. Of these studies, each of which spans at least two
decades, only Li & Liu (2005, p.393) refer to concerns about data quality, partly attributing
the mixed results in the literature to “data insufficiency.”3
The present paper examines the consistency in the construction and coverage of the
FDI data. To minimise the extent of methodological variation, we focus on six Western EU
economies as a reasonably homogenous group of countries with well-developed data
collection and dissemination systems. Asymmetries in datasets containing broader ranges of
countries are expected to be far greater than those unearthed here. In an earlier study on

3

Gaps in the data are sometimes filled by substituting partner-reported outward data for missing inward data
(see Hatzius, 2000), the consequences of which are explored below.
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Ireland’s inward FDI, Barry & O’Mahony (2005) found a large number of structural breaks
and a lack of comparability between the various international FDI data sources due to
methodological differences, inconsistencies in items included, and varying treatments of
financial intermediation. Similar concerns have been raised by Bellak (1998), Fujita (2008)
and Stephan and Pfaffmann (2001).
Among our selection of countries, we include the France, Germany and the United
Kingdom, typically the three largest EU recipients of FDI. Since FDI can be more significant
for smaller economies, we also include three small economies: Belgium, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands.4 Prior to 2002, Belgium and Luxembourg produced a common balance of
payments as the Belgium-Luxembourg Union (BLEU).5
The paper is organised as follows. The next section details the major pitfalls that arise
in comparing FDI data through time and across countries. 6 Section 3 highlights
incompatibilities for individual countries while cross-country asymmetries are discussed in
Section 4. The final section discusses the implications of our findings.

2.

PITFALLS: OVERVIEW
The international standards are set out in the IMF’s Balance of Payments Manuals

with detailed operational guides provided by the OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign
Direct Investment (various issues). The current international standard is set out in the sixth

4

While each has a tax regime that is conducive to FDI, they differ in other significant ways. Conduit investment
is particularly important for Luxembourg and the Netherlands. UNCTAD (2006) estimates that pass-through
FDI accounted for 95 per cent of FDI inflows into Luxembourg in 2002-2005. Our calculations based on Dutch
Central Bank data suggest that, for the Netherlands, inflows including Special Financial Institutions (SFIs) were,
on average, more than four times higher per annum over 1999-2012 than those reported by the OECD, which
did not include this type of FDI.
5
The BLEU sometimes appears as ‘Belgium’ in datasets and in empirical papers.
6
Similar problems arise in the case of both stocks and flows. As most of the papers cited employ flow data we
concentrate on these. Stock data have poorer coverage and also additional discrepancies arise from their
valuation. On pitfalls in the use of the stock data see Beugelsdijk, Hennart, Slangen and Smeets (2010),
O’Mahony (2015). Cantwell and Bellak (1998) and Damgaard and Elkjaer (2014) discuss stock valuation.
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edition of the IMF’s Balance of Payments Manual (‘BPM6’). Although published in 2009,
this was only adopted by most European countries in 2014. 7 Therefore, most data used in
empirical studies nominally conform to earlier standards. The direct precursor to BPM6 is
BPM5, as set out in the fifth edition of the IMF’s Balance of Payments Manual (1993) and
the OECD’s (1996) Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment (third edition).
BPM5 is therefore our main focus in this paper.
For a direct investment relationship to exist, the parent must hold equity of at least 10
per cent in a direct investment enterprise (DIE).8 The main methodological sources of spatial
and temporal incompatibilities we identify include differences in data collection methods, in
the interpretation and application of international standards, in the treatment of Special
Purpose Entities (SPEs) and in the geographic allocation of investments.9 We consider each
of these in turn.

2.1

Differences in Data Collection Methods

FDI data are generally collected through either a settlements or a survey system.
Settlements systems involve the reporting of balance of payments transactions usually via the
banking system while survey systems record FDI transactions reported by resident
enterprises. Settlements systems cannot measure reinvested earnings (RIE), as these do not
cross country boundaries. Supplementary enterprise surveys are therefore often used to
provide estimates of RIE.

7

The Coordinated Direct Investment Survey published annually by the OECD since 2010 and covering direct
investment from 2009 follows BPM6.
8
A further distinction between FDI and MNE activity data: The latter commonly pertain to majority ownership.
9
Different countries have also applied different ownership criteria at various points in time, though a 10 per cent
ownership rule is the norm. These differences may not be hugely significant as FDI holdings tend to be majority
owned (Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, 2007).
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Of the countries in our study, only the United Kingdom has always used a survey
system. The Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Belgium switched to survey systems, while
Germany and France have relied mainly on settlement systems. Survey systems have several
advantages. They can more easily distinguish between FDI and portfolio investments
(Connolly, 2005; Stephan & Pfaffmann, 2001). They allow for the inclusion of estimated
levels of RIE, which settlement systems do not, and they make it easier to capture all intracompany loan components (Connolly, 2005).10 Furthermore, they can deal more easily with
situations where investments need to be reclassified when the parent subsequently owns more
than 10 percent of the equity in the DIE (Stephan & Pfaffmann, 2001).
Data from Industrial Promotion Agencies (IPAs) and tax authorities are sometimes
used as an alternative to balance of payments data, especially for developing countries. Barry
and O’Mahony (2005) and Fujita (2008) find these can differ widely from the corresponding
FDI data.

2.2

Measurement and Treatment of the Components of Direct Investment

Of all the components of FDI, measurement of RIE has been the most variable,
particularly for countries that use settlement systems. The 1992 IMF/OECD Report on the
Measurement of International Capital Flows (‘the Godeaux Report’) indicated that 11 of the
industrial countries in its sample did not compile RIE at that time, noting that this was likely
to be the main reason for the global imbalance between outflows and inflows of FDI.
According to IMF/OECD (2000), six of these had done so by 1997 but international
recommendations continued to be poorly adhered to. The timing of the recording of RIE also
varies, with some countries allocating them to the period when they are earned, according to

As RIE do not cross borders, they are not captured by settlements systems. RIE are therefore calculated,
leading to inaccuracies (Stephan & Pfaffmann, 2001). Many countries supplement their settlements systems
with enterprise surveys to provide estimates of RIE, but coverage varies across countries.
10
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the accrual principle which is recommended in the international standards, and others to the
period when they are used.11 RIE are more significant for the Netherlands than for the other
countries examined. For the most part they are included from 1994. For the BLEU countries,
they began to be included only in 1999 (UNCTAD 2000, 2001, and 2004), while the RIE of
SPEs were not reported by Luxembourg.
There has also been considerable variability in the measurement of intra-company
debt. Such loans can be very substantial but difficult to distinguish from other loans when
settlements systems are used (Connolly, 2005). The IMF and OECD conducted a survey in
2001 on the implementation of international standards which showed that the BLEU
countries did not report long-term loans or trade credits as FDI, France did not report
financial leases or trade credits, and neither Germany nor the Netherlands reported financial
leases (IMF/OECD, 2003). The Godeaux Report suggested that the failure to include shortterm loans between affiliates as FDI and the failure to record cross-border real estate
transactions were further reasons for the large global asymmetries between inward and
outward data (IMF/OECD, 1992).12 The IMF/OECD (2000) Report on the Survey of
Implementation of Methodological Standards for Direct Investment found substantial
improvements in the inclusion of short-term financing but little improvement in recording of
cross-border real estate transactions.
Trade credits continued to be excluded from intra-company loans in the Belgian data
(IMF, 2003) while Germany began to include short-term loans from 1996 (Deutsche
Bundesbank, 1995 and 1999; IMF, 1996). Jungnickel (1995, p.95) argues that the exclusion

The accrual accounting principle requires that the transactions are recorded in the period when the economic
events that give rise to them occur, not when they are settled (OECD, 2008).
12
'The Godeaux Report was the first of a number of surveys, undertaken by the IMF and OECD, on the
implementation of the international standards on direct investment. It examined possible reasons for the
imbalance between global outflows and inflows of direct investment by looking at the implementation of the
standards by individual countries. It concluded that possible reasons for the imbalance were the failure of many
countries to compile RIE, include short-term loans made by affiliates to each other, record and properly classify
SPE activities, record cross-border real estate transactions, and properly classify investment by affiliates in their
parents.’
11
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of some intra-firm loans caused German FDI inflows to be “systematically underestimated.”
As will be seen later, the inclusion of short-term loans and trade credits in German FDI data
from 1996 caused the average annual inward flow into Germany to more than double, in 2005
terms, for the period 1996-2011.13

2.3

Measurement and Treatment of Reverse and Indirect Investments

Reverse investment occurs when a DIE that owns less than 10 per cent of its parent
invests in the parent, through a loan for example. The Godeaux Report suggested that
differing treatments of reverse investments were one reason for the global asymmetries
between inward and outward data. The ‘directional principle’ recommended by BPM5
requires that reverse investment be treated as a disinvestment rather than as an outward
investment. This made reverse investment invisible in the data, affecting the measured size of
FDI and also its geographical allocation. Additionally, reverse investments have occasionally
been classified as ‘portfolio’ or ‘other investments’ in Belgium, Luxembourg, France and
Germany (ECB, 2001; IMF, 2001 and 2003).
An indirect investment is an investment by one DIE in another in the same group.
According to Terrien (2009) only a minority of countries, including the US, Ireland and
Sweden, applied techniques to extend the directional principle to such transactions, as now
recommended by BPM6. BPM5 required countries to operate a Fully Consolidated System
(FCS) of accounting. The FCS covers all enterprises in which the direct investor has a direct

13

We use the host-country GDP deflator on the assumption that the primary issue of interest is the real-economy
effect of inward FDI on the host country. Deflators are sourced from World Development Indicators. Various
deflators are used in the empirical literature: host-country GDP deflators (Pain, 1997), host-country capital
formation deflators (Hatzius, 2000), home-country GDP deflators (Egger & Pfaffermayer, 2004), the US GDP
deflator (De Ménil, 1999; Demir, 2016; Schiavo, 2007), investment deflators (Mold, 2003) and the US CPI
(Buch, Kokta & Piazolo, 2003; Razin & Sadka, 2012). Real exchange rates are also occasionally used
(Petroulas, 2007).
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investment interest, including all subsidiaries, associates, and branches of the direct investor,
in order to record all direct investment relationships.
In 1997, OECD countries had a poor record in applying these recommendations
(IMF/OECD, 2000). Of the six countries studied here, only the Netherlands (and the United
Kingdom from 2003) fully applied FCS (IMF, 2001 and 2003). The United Kingdom only
partially applied FCS before 2003, as consolidated accounts were not legally required, while
France lacked the data on the indirect relationships between affiliated enterprises necessary to
apply FCS (IMF, 2001). Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg fully applied FCS to equity and
intra-company loan transactions but not to RIE.

2.4

Treatment of the Transactions of Special Purpose Entities

Broadly, SPEs are entities established in economies other than the country of
residence of the parent company, with little or no employment and few or no local operations
(OECD, 2008). They are often foreign-owned financial holding companies, though not all
holding companies are SPEs (ECB/Eurostat, 2004). 14
SPEs can be used for both pass-through and round-tripping investments. If one DIE
receives funds from abroad from another enterprise in its group which it then lends on to
another group company also based overseas, BPM5 recommended that this be recorded in
both inward and outward FDI data, although there was no real contribution to the local
economy. This therefore overstates the level of MNE activity in an economy. Furthermore,
the inward and outward funds may be recorded differently in the balance of payments,

14

There is no one unique commonly accepted definition of SPEs, but they have been defined as majority
foreign-owned entities, organised or established in economies abroad, which are engaged primarily in
international transactions but in few or no local operations (ECB/ Eurostat, 2004) with little or no contribution
to employment or production (DNB, 2008; OECD, 2012). Holding companies may be used for the efficient
organisation of a firm’s overseas activities and may not be deemed to be SPEs when they have a physical
presence through buildings and employees, for example.
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appearing variously as portfolio flows and as FDI.15 The use of SPEs for conduit investment
is growing and UNCTAD (2013) has attributed the increased volatility of FDI flows to SPEs.
An enterprise established in a small country is more likely to qualify as an SPE
because small countries have a larger ‘rest of the world’ (DNB, 2008). UNCTAD (2013)
describes the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Ireland as “SPE-favourable”
economies.16 BPM5 recommended that, in general, SPEs should be treated the same as other
DIEs with the exception that, for SPEs established for the sole purpose of financial
intermediation, only transactions associated with equity and permanent debt should be
included as direct investment (IMF, 2003).17
Although the 1997 IMF/OECD survey on the implementation of international
standards found major improvements in the treatment of SPE transactions, Belgium, France
and Germany did not make this exclusion (IMF, 2001 and 2003; Patterson, Montanjees,
Motala & Cordillo, 2004). Only the United Kingdom fully followed BPM5 in its treatment of
SPEs (IMF, 2001 and 2003). SPEs are likely to have been largely omitted from earlier BLEU
data as holding company transactions were recorded under ‘Other Investment’ rather than
direct investment (Eurostat, 1984).
Since their separation for balance of payments purposes in 2002, Belgium and
Luxembourg have differed in their treatment of SPEs. In Belgium, special tax status was
granted in 1982 to coordination centres (subsidiaries or branches of MNEs locating certain
activities or invisible transactions in Belgium) (NBB, 2007). According to Bisciari and Piette

Forfás (2002) comments that inflows to the Irish International Financial Services Centre (IFSC) – which
roughly approximate to SPE flows – are recorded as direct investment while outward flows tend to be made up
of portfolio investment. For Belgium, inflows tend to be equity and outward flows mainly intra-company loans,
which the National Bank of Belgium (2007) attributes to the existence of coordination centres.
16
Tax regimes in small countries may focus more on attracting FDI because small countries lack the advantage
of large domestic markets.
17
According to OECD (2008), SPE transactions were not to be included in the detailed geographical and
sectoral data produced by the OECD under BPM6. However, the 2015 OECD data show that of the six countries
in this study only two (Belgium and the Netherlands) provided disaggregated this detail by resident SPEs/nonSPEs.
15
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(2007), coordination centres became the major source of corporate investment in Belgium
from 1986, with the help of a special tax status, subsequently phased out under pressure from
the European Commission. Inclusion of these centres caused inward FDI flows for the period
2003-2005 to almost double, from around 5.8 per cent to 10.6 per cent of Belgian GDP
(Bisciari & Piette, 2007). Luxembourg initially omitted SPEs from its national FDI flow data.
Consequently, Eurostat began to collect these data from 1999 to add to the national data
disseminated for Luxembourg. Luxembourg excludes SPE RIE transactions from its flow
data and all SPE transactions from its position data (ECB/Eurostat, 2004). However, more
recently, the UNCTAD and aggregate OECD series began to exclude all SPE transactions
from the Luxembourg flow data.
In the Netherlands, SPEs are known as Special Financial Institutions (SFIs). FDI
flows associated with SFIs are substantial but have relatively little impact on the Dutch
economy (DNB, 2003). For this reason, they omitted or ‘neutralised’ in the Dutch balance of
payments data (ECB/Eurostat, 2004) but recorded in partner countries’ balance of payments.

2.5

Differences in Geographical Allocations

Differences in geographical allocations are particularly relevant for gravity models
which use bilateral FDI data (see De Ménil, 1999; Razin & Sadka, 2007). BPM5
recommended use of the ‘debtor/creditor principle’ whereby FDI flows are allocated to the
economies of residence of the DIE or the direct investor. France, Germany, the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom (IMF, 2003) used this principle. Belgium and Luxembourg on the
other hand mainly used the ‘transactor principle,’ whereby flows are allocated to the
economy that funds are payable to or from, even if this is not the economy of residence of the
DIE or the direct investor (OECD, 2008).'
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3.

INCONSISTENCIES IN THE FDI DATA FOR INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES
We now turn to an examination of the time-series data for individual countries. We

find numerous structural breaks due to methodological changes and considerable variation
across the series produced by the various international and national agencies.
The IMF publishes annual FDI flow data, including component breakdowns, in the
Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbooks and online, and in summary form in International
Financial Statistics (IFS). These derive from the balance of payments data reported by
individual countries and suffer inconsistencies when countries use different collection and
compilation methodologies.
The OECD publishes data on both aggregate flows and data disaggregated
geographically and by sector in its International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbooks and
online. Compared with the aggregate data, the disaggregated data may have different sources
and, because of the greater level of detail, be less frequently revised. In this section we report
the online aggregate data.
UNCTAD data are published in annual World Investment Reports and online.
Although largely consistent with the IMF series, the source for EU-country data switched
from the IMF to national agencies at various dates between 1986 and 1999.
Eurostat data focus mainly on EU member states. They are published in the agency’s
EU Foreign Direct Investment Yearbooks and online. Some earlier data are estimates and can
be quite different from those produced by other agencies. Eurostat (1994) referred to a ‘major
lack of coherence’ in the data as a result of differing concepts, classifications and collection
systems of member states, while Eurostat (1995) warned that its figures should be treated
with caution due to the extent of estimation and harmonisation.

12
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In compiling the data, we came across numerous revisions, some very substantial. The
frequency of revision varies across series with the UNCTAD data, in particular, showing less
frequent revision than other sources.

3.1

Germany

Methodological changes affecting the German time-series for the period under
discussion include changes in qualifying ownership percentages and reporting value
thresholds in 1989, 1993, and 1999, as well as in the various items included as FDI. Also
from 1989, Germany began to include direct loans of associated enterprises other than the
direct investor (Grosch, 2003). BPM5 changes made to the German data included the
implementation of the 10 per cent ownership rule, the inclusion of short-term loans and trade
credits under FDI (IMF, 2003), the application of the directional principle and the adoption of
the accrual principle in the calculation of RIE. Despite the substantial backdating of these
changes to 1996 or earlier (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1999; IMF, 2003), the Bundesbank (1999,
p.54) noted that methodological changes meant “recent figures are not fully comparable with
those of previous years.”
The various series include different components of FDI and can differ considerably.
Patterson, Montanjees, Motala & Cordillo, (2004) cite an IMF/OECD survey in 2002 that
found that Germany excluded real estate and reverse investment from data reported to the
OECD but not from that reported to the IMF All of the series increase sharply from 1996. We
estimate that the inclusion of short-term loans and trade credits in the German data from 1996
increased the recorded German inward FDI flows by an annual average of $52.20 billion (in
2005 terms) over 1996-2011. Hence, the flows recorded in the new series are more than
double those recorded in the old series. Figure 1 shows the discrepancy between the IMF and

13
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Eurostat series for 1985-1999. The omission of RIE from the Eurostat series until 1992
explains it being lower than the other series until then. This position reversed after 1993.
______________
Put figure 1 here
______________

Deflation and averaging make the various series more compatible but differences remain, as
shown in Table 1. Deflated to 2005 prices, the inflows recorded by Eurostat for 1994-1998
were an annual $14 billion higher on average – or more than double – the flows reported by
the IMF.
_____________
Put table 1 here
_____________

3.2

France

Figure 2 shows French FDI inflows as recorded by various agencies for the period
1990 to 1994. Up to 1992, the UNCTAD and IMF series were equal and more than 30 per
cent higher than the Eurostat series. For large economies, even minor differences can be
substantial in monetary terms. In 1992, for example, the UNCTAD/IMF data exceeded the
Eurostat data for France by $7 billion in 2005 prices. All series show recorded inflows
increasing from 1995 onwards, for which a contributory factor is likely to be the inclusion
from 1994 of short-term credits and RIE (Eurostat, 2001).
______________
Put figure 2 here
______________
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3.3

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom is the only country in our sample that used an enterprise survey
system throughout the period. Nevertheless, there are several structural breaks in the United
Kingdom data. First, oil company direct investment transactions began to be included only in
1984. Thus, the dip in recorded FDI flows in 1984 suggests a stronger reduction in FDI
inflows or disinvestments elsewhere in the economy than is apparent in the data (Bellak,
1998). Second, short-term capital flows between security-dealing concerns in the United
Kingdom and their overseas-related companies were excluded in 1989 with this change
revised back to 1988. Third, the adoption of BPM5 lowered the ownership threshold from 20
per cent to 10 per cent in 1997 and removed the Channel Islands from the United Kingdom
FDI statistics.
Figure 3 shows three of the main international series for the period 1983-1997. The
OECD series is generally lower than the IMF data. The Eurostat series is much lower than the
other two until 1992 when Eurostat began to include RIE. Although the series all move
broadly together, discrepancies are large in dollar terms. In 1986, the inflows to the United
Kingdom recorded by the IMF were over $6 billion more (in 2005 prices) than those recorded
by Eurostat and $3 billion higher than those in the OECD series. In 1997 inflows reported by
the IMF were almost $5 billion (at 2005 prices) greater than those recorded by the OECD and
Eurostat.
______________
Put figure 3 here
______________
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3.4

Netherlands

As discussed earlier, a significant difference between Dutch FDI data and that for
other countries in our study is the exclusion of the transactions of SPEs/SFIs from the Dutch
data as reported to the international agencies. 18 Since 1999, the Dutch central bank, De
Nederlandsche Bank (DNB), has published FDI data both inclusive and exclusive of SFIs. On
average over the period 1999-2012, FDI inflows including SFI transactions were more than
four times the inflows as reported with these transactions excluded.
Figure 4 compares the OECD series for 1999-2012 with DNB data that includes SFI
transactions. Deflating, the average annual difference between the two series for the period
1999-2012 is over $120 billion in 2005 prices.
______________
Put figure 4 here
______________

Although the Netherlands is a relatively small economy, its FDI flows are of global
significance. When SPE transactions are included, inward FDI flows to the Netherlands made
up 13 per cent of global FDI inflows over 1999-2012.19 Their exclusion severely
compromises comparisons between the Netherlands and most other countries, and biases any
dataset that includes the Netherlands without controlling for this issue.

3.5

Belgium and Luxembourg

Until 1998 the main international series reported for the BLEU are broadly similar,
with small deviations attributable to differences in updating periods or currency conversion
rates. The UNCTAD data deviated sharply from the other sources from 1999, when that

18
19

Among EU members, Austria, Cyprus and Hungary also exclude SPE transactions from their FDI data.
Authors’ calculations based on data from De Nederlandsche Bank and various World Investment Reports.
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agency began to source data from Belgian’s central bank, the National Bank of Belgium
(NBB), rather than from the IMF as had been done heretofore.
From 2002, Belgium and Luxembourg have reported their payments balances
separately. The NBB continued to compile the Belgian data according to the pre-2002
methodology, while the Luxembourg central bank (Banque Centrale du Luxembourg, BCL),
which assumed compilation duties for that country, introduced a number of changes, causing
a break in the series.
SPEs are of huge significance for Luxembourg. According to ECB (2007) and IMF
(2003) they account for around 85 per cent of total inward transactions, though other sources
suggest a figure of around 95 per cent. Table 2 shows the average for 2002-2012 at over 91
per cent, excluding the RIE of SPEs.
______________
Put table 2 here
______________

UNCTAD no longer included SPE transactions in their Luxembourg flow data, giving rise to
a huge discrepancy between it and the OECD series, for example, as seen in Figure 5.
Deflating to 2005 prices, the OECD flows averaging almost $158 billion per annum over the
period 2002-2012 are vastly higher than the average annual UNCTAD flows of US$23
billion.
______________
Put figure 5 here
______________
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4.

CROSS-COUNTRY ASYMMETRIES IN THE FDI DATA
Examination of the ‘mirror’ or counter-party data demonstrates the extent of

discrepancies resulting from differences in how countries measure FDI. The most extensive
time-series for these purposes is the OECD International Direct Investment Statistics
database, which contains geographically disaggregated flow and stock data from 1985.20
More recently, UNCTAD has begun to publish online bilateral flow and stock data from 2001
and the IMF has produced mirror stock data from 2009 in its Coordinated Direct Investment
Survey (CDIS).21 We use the OECD data because of our concentration on flows, in addition
to the lengthier time series and wider usage. Large discrepancies arise in the vast majority of
bilateral cases we study, a selection of which is reported upon below. Figure 6 shows that for
most of the period 1985-2012, Germany’s recorded inflows from the Netherlands are higher
than the corresponding outflows recorded by the Netherlands.
______________
Put figure 6 here
______________

As differences in the timing of the recording of transactions, particularly those
occurring close to the beginning or end of a reporting period, account for some proportion of
bilateral discrepancies (Timmermann, 1997), we also average the data, deflated to 2005
prices. Overall, the German data are higher on average by $2.82 billion per annum in 2005
prices (Figure 7). The German figures are double the Dutch figures for 1985-1997 and more
than three times higher for 1998-2012.
______________

20

Connolly (2005) and Stephan and Pfaffmann (2001) point out that disaggregated FDI data are less reliable
than aggregated data.
21
The OECD and IMF mirror stock series differ in that the latter includes SPEs for all countries (Weyzig,
2013). There are other discrepancies as well however. For example, for 2010 the Netherlands reports an inward
direct investment position of $46.9 billion with Germany in the OECD data compared with $114.5 billion in the
CDIS data, while the figure reported by Germany in both cases is $82.5 billion.
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Put figure 7 here
______________

As the Netherlands at this time omitted SPE transactions from its data, it is to be
expected that the Dutch figures were lower than those reported by partner countries. 22 The
growing discrepancy between the two series, as seen in Figures 6 and 7, is attributable to the
increasing importance of SPE transactions in Dutch FDI.
IMF (1996), based on work undertaken by the DNB, also points to differences in
estimation procedures employed by the two countries, and to differences in how FDI is
defined. As noted earlier, the German data prior to 1996 omitted short-term loans, and the
equity share required for inclusion as DI was 20 per cent rather than 10 per cent until 1999.
Germany also recorded reverse investments differently, with equity transactions recorded as
portfolio investment until 1996, for example. The IMF report also suggested that large
discrepancies in recorded RIE could be attributable to “fiscal considerations” (IMF, 1996).23
Figure 8 shows that the German-reported outward flows to the Netherlands are also
higher and more volatile than the mirror flows reported by the Netherlands. In 2005 prices,
the German data are on average $1.1 billion higher per annum than the Dutch data.
______________
Put figure 8 here
______________
Similar discrepancies arise between the Netherlands and United Kingdom
counterparty data, as shown in Figure 9. As expected, the United Kingdom data are generally
higher (by an average of almost $3 billion per annum, when deflated). According to Patterson
et al. (2004, p.16), the main difference between the Netherlands and United Kingdom data

22

Subsequently, under BPM6, the Netherlands has disseminated data inclusive of SPE transactions.
The IMF does not elaborate, but this is likely to refer to the US tax deferral system, which incentivises RIE in
low-tax jurisdictions.’
23
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pertains to the transactions of Dutch SPEs. They conclude, “in effect the Dutch data suggest
that most of the large United Kingdom investment in the Netherlands is ultimately employed
in third countries, with the Netherlands acting as a conduit for tax or other reasons.”
______________
Put figure 9 here
______________

Turning now to flows between large economies, Figure 10 compares the mirror data
for French inflows from the United Kingdom. The French-reported data are generally higher
by an average of $1.55 billion (in 2005 prices).
______________
Put figure 10 here
______________

A small number of empirical studies use three-year or five-year averages to smooth
out volatility in the data (see Globerman & Shapiro, 2002; Razin & Sadka, 2007; Taylor,
2008). Figure 11 shows three-year averages for the two series, deflated by the French GDP
deflator.24 Much of the volatility disappears but substantial discrepancies remain. 25 On
average, for the period 1985-2011, France reported its annual inflows from the United
Kingdom as $1.85 billion higher on average than those reported by the United Kingdom.
______________
Put figure 11 here
______________

24

Rather than making this comparison for each pair of countries, for brevity we provide an example of the
discrepancies that arise even in the averaged data.
25
For 1985-2011 the standard deviation for the annual French data was $5.5 billion. This fell to $4.4 billion
when three-year averages were used. Corresponding figures for the UK data were $3.2 billion and $2.3 billion
respectively.
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There are large differences in the raw United Kingdom-Germany mirror data,
particularly from 1998. Deflating and averaging the data smooths out some of this volatility,
removing almost all of the discrepancy for United Kingdom inward flows from Germany for
the entire period 1985-2012, although substantial discrepancies remain across sub-periods
(Figure 12).26
______________
Put figure 12 here
______________

Table 3 summarises the larger asymmetries in counter-party flows for 1985-2012 for
countries other than Belgium and Luxembourg.27 Unsurprisingly, many involve the
Netherlands, though there are also substantial discrepancies between the larger economies.
______________
Put table 3 here
______________

5.

CONCLUSIONS
Despite focusing on a relatively homogeneous group of countries, our study has

unearthed major differences in how countries compile and report their FDI statistics.
Discrepancies will be greater for more diverse groups of countries. Pooling across large
numbers of countries will increase the heterogeneity in the data. Changes in methodology, the
timing of which is not uniform across countries, can cause large structural breaks, suggesting
that the FDI data are also not directly comparable across time. Using long time series

26

The time-series are split at 1998 due to the substantial increase in the volume and volatility of FDI from the
late 1990s.
27
Belgium and Luxembourg are excluded due to data limitations. Calculations for these countries unearthed
large asymmetries, mainly attributable to Luxembourg, but these cannot usefully be compared with those
reported in Table 3.
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increases the number of structural breaks present in the data. Bilateral data, used in gravity
models, suffer from asymmetric methodologies, particularly with respect to geographical
allocation of investment and conduit investments.
There are also differences between published series and data revisions can be very
substantial. National sources are the most up-to-date but these should be treated with care in
cross-country studies, as they are more likely than international agency data to display
methodological variation. A number of empirical studies mix together data from different
sources that are not necessarily comparable.
Methodological coherence has improved over time but so too has conduit investment.
As the extent of conduit investment varies across countries and over time, it reduces the
usefulness of the measured FDI data for comparative purposes.
Our study recommends extreme caution in drawing conclusions based on FDI data.
Problems are reduced when data are aggregated across time periods and discounted using an
appropriate deflator, but this of course severely reduces sample size and hugely restricts the
range of hypotheses that the data can be used to explore.
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Tables

Table 1:

Average Annual Inward FDI Flows to Germany:
(US $ billion, deflated to 2005)
IMF

1985-2010

29.0

UNCTAD
26.1

1985-1997

5.3

5.8

OECD
28.5

Eurostat
30.4

National
Series
28.9

5.3

7.1

5.3

1998-2010
52.6
46.4
51.6
53.7
Sources: As in the text, other than national data from the Deutsche Bundesbank database.

52.4
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Table 2:
Year

SPE Transactions as Percentage of Inward FDI Flows to Luxembourg
SPE per cent of Equity

SPE per cent of IntraCompany Loans

SPE per cent of Total

2002
97.2
172.3
96.3
2003
99.3
82.9
95.3
2004
97.5
79.7
93.4
2005
89.7
99.9
96.0
2006
69.0
123.7
75.0
2007
123.3
82.9
115.6
2008
81.0
110.1
93.0
2009
94.7
170.3
87.1
2010
92.2
114.3
82.6
2011
95.5
117.4
97.8
2012
63.4
93.0
73.9
Annual Average
91.2
113.3
91.5
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from BCL/STATEC Balance of Payments of Luxembourg.
Note: RIE of SPEs are excluded from these figures.
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Table 3:

Largest Absolute Asymmetries Found in Mirror FDI Flows, 1985-2012
Flows

Average Annual Discrepancy
($ billion, 2005 Prices)

Netherlands Inward Flows from Germany

10.13

Netherlands Inward Flows from the United Kingdom

7.94

Germany Inward Flows from the United Kingdom

7.64

United Kingdom Inward Flows from Germany

6.72

United Kingdom Inward Flows from the Netherlands

5.65

Germany Inward Flows from the Netherlands

5.05

Netherlands Inward Flows from France

4.99

United Kingdom Inward Flows from the France

4.41

France Inward Flows from the United Kingdom
Note: These are average discrepancies regardless of direction.

4.28
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Figures

Figure 1:

Inward FDI Flows to Germany, 1985-1999:
Comparison of Reporting Agencies

60

US $ billion
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IMF

Eurostat

Note: Eurostat data converted to US$ using Eurostat period average exchange rates.
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Figure 2:

Inward FDI Flows to France, 1990-1994:
Comparison of Reporting Agencies
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Sources: As in the text.
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Figure 3:

Inward FDI Flows to the United Kingdom, 1983-1997:
Comparison of Reporting Agencies
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Figure 4:

Inward FDI Flows to the Netherlands, 1999-2012:
Effect of the Exclusion of SPE Transactions
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Sources: OECD International Direct Investment Statistics database, De Nederlandsche Bank Balance of
Payments database.
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Figure 5:

Inward FDI Flows to Luxembourg, 2002-2012:
Comparison of Reporting Agencies
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Figure 6:

Inward FDI Flows to Germany from the Netherlands, 1985-2012:
Comparison of Mirror Data
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Source: OECD International Direct Investment Statistics database.
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US $ billion

Figure 7:

Average Annual Inward FDI Flows to Germany from the Netherlands
(Deflated to 2005)
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Source: OECD International Direct Investment Statistics database, World Development Indicators (base year:
2005).
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Figure 8:

Netherlands Inward FDI Flows from Germany, 1985-2012:
Comparison of Mirror Data
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Figure 10:

Inward FDI Flows to France from the United Kingdom, 1985-2012:
Comparison of Mirror Data
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Figure 11:

Inward FDI Flows to France from the United Kingdom, 1985-2011:
Three-Year Averages, Deflated to 2005
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Source: OECD International Direct Investment Statistics database, World Development Indicators (base year
2005).
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Figure 12:

Average Annual Inward FDI Flows to the United Kingdom from Germany
(Deflated to 2005)
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Source: OECD International Direct Investment Statistics database, World Development Indicators (base year
2005).
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